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The Community of Rights
Human Rights and the Concept of Nature in the Context of 
the French Revolution and the Terror
In the twentieth century it became increasingly clear that the distinc-
tion between man and citizen in the Déclaration des droits de l’homme 
et du citoyen (1789) is a decisive one.  Human rights seem to apply 
only to people living within a community that is able to enforce the 
rights of its members.  In the words of Hannah Arendt, “we became 
aware of the existence of a right to have rights…and a right to be-
long to some kind of organized community, only when millions of 
people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights be-
cause of the new global political situation” (Arendt 1976, 296f.).  Ac-
cording to Arendt, the rights of safety, freedom of speech, liberty, 
and so on are one thing, but a basic “right to have rights” is even 
more fundamental – and yet this basic right remains the privilege of 
only some.  Werner Hamacher puts it this way:
In distinction to such rights [the human rights of the 
1948-charter], the right to have rights is a privi-legium in 
the strictest sense, a prelegal premise, a protoright, in 
which it is left open, what a human may be, who a human 
may be, and which rights may be granted to him aside 
from this unique one of belonging to humanity and of 
formulating his rights correspondingly (Hamacher 2004, 
353).
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The crux of this quote is the way the question of what a human is or 
how the human is defined becomes directly related to having or not 
having human rights.  In the twentieth century the nation-state has 
been the leading authority when it comes to determining who is 
included in and excluded from what I will call the community of 
rights.  The nation-state, however, was only in its adolescence in the 
age of the French Revolution when the human rights were drafted 
for the first time, but the question of who had a right to have rights 
was nonetheless heavily debated inside and outside of the National 
Assembly.  This article is about the negotiation of the limits of the 
community of rights in the age of the French Revolution and the 
Reign of Terror, and it has a special emphasis on the question of 
women’s rights.
A crucial notion in the establishment of a legal and normative 
framework surrounding the community of rights in revolution-
ary France 1789-1794 is that of nature or the idea of the natural. 
Not least because of the huge influence of the nature-based writ-
ings of Rousseau, the ideas of nature and the natural gained enor-
mous moral and rhetorical authority during the eighteenth century; 
however, these ideas were defined, understood and operational-
ized in exceedingly different ways.  My claim is that in order to 
have rights it is vital to be and act in accordance with a concept of 
nature or an idea of the natural, a concept or an idea that is fun-
damentally unstable.  I distinguish between i) the idea of human 
nature inherent in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citi-
zen and ii) the state of nature important to the thinking of Max-
imilien de Robespierre (1758-1794) and the legality of the Reign 
of Terror.  The former is an inclusive understanding of humanity 
in the sense that everyone, independent of sex, race, and religion, 
is as a matter of principle included in the human community of 
rights.  To Robespierre, contrarily, humankind is a delimited group 
existing in a state of nature, implying that the Republic has a right 
to defend itself to the death against its enemies.  It is an exclusive 
concept of man because it operates with the idea of an inside and 
an outside of the community of rights.  Consequently, while shar-
ing their nature-based argumentation, the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen on the one hand and the law of the Terror on 
the other define and operationalize nature and the natural in dif-
ferent ways.
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My starting point is the relatively unknown author and political 
activist Olympe de Gouges (1748-1793), who was born in the city of 
Montauban in southern France, the child of Anne-Olympe Mouis-
set and the butcher Pierre Gouze.  Within the last twenty years she 
has gained some prominence especially in gender-oriented research 
on the French Revolution, primarily because of her pamphlet Les 
droits de la femme (1791), which includes a re-written version of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, a contract proposal 
that equal men and women can sign when agreeing upon marriage 
and a critique of the handling of the slaves in the French colonies. 
Here is a radical voice that criticizes man – “the dumbest animal 
from Paris to Peru, from Japan to Rome” (de Gouges 1791, 5) – and 
that sees through the sexual and racial discrimination that the revo-
lutionaries’ ideal of equality was unable to bring to an end.  The 
fraternal equality of the revolutionaries was a challenge to the hier-
archical and corporate state order of l’ancien régime, but women 
were not, as de Gouges points out, included in the revolutionary 
band of equals.  Contrary to what these egalitarian impulses in her 
political thought might lead one to believe, her pamphlet also con-
tains a respectful dedication to the queen Marie-Antoinette, who in 
September 1791 was less popular than ever because of her involve-
ment in King Louis XVI’s flight from Paris to Varennes.1 While de 
Gouges radicalizes the idea of equality in the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen by including women and slaves in the 
community of rights, she also defends a patriarchal monarchy in 
which responsibility rests upon the shoulders of the citizens to help 
the king “as a father whose affairs have been thrown into disorder” 
(de Gouges 1993, [I] 41).  During the stressful period of The French 
Revolution, this was no way to make friends.  
The focus of this article will be the radical and egalitarian part of 
her thinking.  Not because her royalist and even patriarchal writ-
ings are unimportant, but because her more radical reflections show 
some of the far-reaching consequences of declaring universal hu-
man rights on the basis of an inclusive idea of human nature.  More-
1 See Hunt (1992, 89ff) for a historical account of the hatred towards Marie Antoi-
nette culminating in her execution in 1793 but before that already manifest in 
pamphlets and pornographic material.  See Cole (2011, 45ff).  for a good descrip-
tion of just how problematical a dedication to Marie Antoinette would be con-
ceived in Paris in September 1791.
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over, these thoughts are based on a conception of nature that she 
brings to bear upon key issues of the revolutionary age such as the 
question of women and – when she was beheaded in 1793 – the law 
of the Terror.  Her radical political writings, then, will be used as a 
way to interrogate the concept of nature and its key role in the es-
tablishment of the community of rights.  Or, closer to the wording 
of Arendt and Hamacher, gaining a better understand of her na-
ture-based argumentation is a way to interrogate the negotiation of 
who has the right to have rights in the age of the French Revolution.
The Political Operationalization of Human Nature
A recurring theme in the works of de Gouges is the illegitimate 
child, and because she consistently uses the term enfant naturel, I 
will consider this theme as a way of engaging with the idea of hu-
man nature.2 It is evident already from the title of an article in the 
Encyclopédie –”Batard ou enfant naturel” (Encyclopédie 2,138) – that 
it is normal to speak of non-marital children in different ways in 
this period.  Hence, in connection with horticulture, the bastard 
designates a kind of weed or a “wild plant that has not been grown” 
(Encyclopédia 2, 139), while her more positive term “natural child” 
has associations with someone untouched by civilization’s institu-
tions or with an unspoiled example of the nature of man.  Defend-
ing the rights of natural children might seem like an unambitious 
political agenda and given that de Gouges apparently considered 
herself to be the illegitimate child of the archbishop Jean Georges 
Lefranc de Pompignan, it might even be considered a selfish strug-
gle for her own rights.  Such a critique would, none the less, be 
mistaken because she manages to turn the natural child into explo-
sive political material.  In her pamphlet Les droits de la femme, she 
uses the defense of the natural child as an attack upon the most 
important document of the revolutionary republicans:  the Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man and Citizen.
In the original version of the Declaration, article XI is about free-
dom of speech:  ”The free communication of thoughts and opinions 
is one of the most precious of the rights of man.  Every citizen may 
2 The illegitimate child appears in the play Zamore et Mirza (1788) – which is the 
original title to the play L’esclavage des noirs – and in the epistolary novel Mémoire 
de Madame de Valmont (1788), in the pamphlet Séance Royale.  Motion de Mgr le duc 
d’Orléans, ou Les songes patriotiques (1789) and in Les droits de la femme (1791).
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therefore speak, write and print freely, if he accepts his own respon-
sibility for any abuse of this liberty in the cases set by the law” (in 
Hunt 2008, 222).  In de Gouges’ version, article XI is still about free-
dom of speech; however, while she keeps the original rhetorical 
framing, her version uses a surprising, concrete example – the right 
of the mother to appoint the biological father of her child – to advo-
cate freedom of speech:
The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one 
of the most precious rights of woman, because that liberty 
ensures the legitimacy of children with respect to their fa-
thers.  Therefore, without a barbarous prejudice forcing 
her to disguise the truth, every female Citizen may freely 
say, “I am the mother of a child who belongs to you”, al-
though she must answer for her abuses of this liberty in 
cases determined by the Law (de Gouges 1791, 9f  [in Cole 
2011,  33]).
These lines are de Gouges’ way of pointing out that the abstract 
principles of equality and freedom of speech do not really apply to 
women.  She argues that a “barbarous prejudice” or an implicit mor-
al law has put up a barrier between equality in principle and equal-
ity in praxis, meaning that it is one thing to speak in favor of the idea 
of equality but a completely different thing to practice equality in 
everyday interactions between men and women.  Her argument re-
lies on a radical and inclusive idea of human nature and of universal 
human rights because only this universal idea makes the distinction 
between principle and praxis possible.  Her version of article XI is 
explosive material not only because women revealing the infidelity 
of husbands would challenge the traditional orderliness of society’s 
established gender roles, but also, and perhaps even more impor-
tantly, because it would have far-reaching effects on hereditary law 
if freedom of speech were used to loosen the tie between marriage 
and paternity.  
In the perspective of the history of law, marriage law and the 
right to divorce only really became important issues in the Nation-
al Assembly in 1792 and especially in the weeks leading up to 20 
September, when both men and women got the right to dissolve a 
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marriage.3 But already before that – in August 1791, just before de 
Gouges published her pamphlet in September – the member of 
Parliament M.  Bouehotte proposed a list of laws under the head-
ing “On the Conditions of People”.  He underscored that some of 
his proposals – regarding the relation between children and their 
parents – “do not seem to be anything but moral principles” but 
then adds the rhetorical question, “[S]houldn’t  good morals form 
the foundation of laws?” (Archieves Parlementaires 1867,  [29] 220). 
What is interesting about his proposal is that it reveals some of the 
concrete hereditary consequences an attack such as de Gouges’s 
upon the institution of family would entail.  
To Bouehotte, marriage is a natural moral alliance between a man 
and a woman.  While repeating a formulation from the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen, he writes, “no property, no profes-
sion, and no official standing or function can take away the natu-
ral and inalienable right [le droit naturel et inaliénable] of a citizen 
to engage in marriage” (Archieves Parlementaires 1867, 219).  He is 
also interested in equality, but by the fifth article of his proposal it 
becomes clear that the equality characterizing the natural condi-
tion of marriage is a questionable one.  “In our laws the condition 
2of women shall be equal to men’s as far as it is allowed by the 
difference between the sexes.  The last part of the sentence is 
deemed necessary in order “not to disturb the natural law accord-
ing to which the husband is the head of the family.“  While de 
Gouges used the concept of nature as a way to recognize children 
born outside of marriage, Bouehotte uses it differently as a way to 
preserve the patriarchal institutionalization of marriage.  When 
the natural can serve as part of the argument both for and against 
the preservation of the traditional marriage, it becomes apparent 
how “the natural” was operationalized politically in different 
ways in this period.  In other words, here we begin to see how the 
idea of nature can function both as a principle of inclusion (wom-
en and illegitimate children should enter the community of rights) 
and of exclusion (in marriage, women should not disturb the nat-
ural authority of men).  And it is no surprise that Bouehotte’s nat-
uralization of marriage has consequences as to who is appointed 
father to the family’s children.  He says, “the lawfully engaged 
3 Cf.  Cole (2011, 148).
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marriages attest to who is the father of children brought to this 
world while the marriage exists.”  
It is precisely this institutionalization of paternity that de Gouges 
attacks, because infidelity and sex before marriage is a fact that 
causes some women and children to be left without rights outside 
the natural family.  Bouehotte draws the hereditary consequences 
of his proposal when he says, “the legitimate children are equal 
among them and the heritage of the father and the mother can only 
be distributed in different sizes according to the laws dealing with 
lapse of inheritance, marriage after widowhood, and marriage after 
divorce” (Archieves Parlementaires 1867,  [29] 220).  Equality, then, is 
something existing between the “legitimate children” and it is their 
inheritance that is legally formalized.  
The illegitimate or natural child, in the thought of de Gouges, 
serves the purpose of carrying through a change of political per-
spective from a perspective of social standing to one of gender.  By 
addressing inequality through the lens of gender, she got enemies 
among the conservatives as well as among the revolutionaries of 
her time – a somewhat surprising fact that can be explained by un-
derstanding the French Revolution as a rebellion of brothers against 
the paternal authority of King Louis XVI.4 Obviously, there is a 
great difference between the revolutionary idea of equality on the 
one hand and the hierarchical structure of the monarchy on the oth-
er but no matter whether power lies among the brothers or with the 
father, the women and children are left outside.  This exclusion of 
women from the political domain is what de Gouges sees and un-
derstands.  With the idea of universal human rights as her point of 
departure, she tries to redirect the political discussion in such a way 
that the fronts are no longer between the equality of brothers and the 
patriarchal authority.  Instead, there is a confrontation between men 
and women, those entitled to and those not entitled to inheritance, 
and in the end between those with the right to have rights and those 
without the right to have rights.
So far, de Gouges has been considered as a representative of the 
idea of universal human rights for everyone and not just for the rev-
4 In The Family Romance of the French Revolution Lynn Hunt uses Freud’s narra-
tive from Totem und Tabu (1913) about the brothers killing the Ur-father in or-
der to gain access to his privileges as a model for the French Revolution.  Cf. 
especially Hunt (1992, 6ff).  
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olutionary brothers.  The foundation for de Gouges and her demand 
to broaden out and include more people in the community of rights 
has been an idea of universal, individually based natural rights.  But 
as Bouehotte’s legal proposal demonstrated, the idea of the natural 
can be used differently to carry out other kinds of political and ju-
ridical arguments.  In the following analysis of the trial and death 
sentencing of de Gouges this other kind of usage of a natural argu-
mentation will take on further relevance as the idea of a state of na-
ture and its importance to the legal thinking of Robespierre and the 
Reign of Terror takes centre stage.  Here too, it will be an open ques-
tion who has the right to have rights and who will be excluded from 
the community of rights.
The Terror Legislation and its Usage 
of the Concept of Nature
Olympe de Gouges was arrested in July 1793 primarily because of 
her pamphlet Les trois urnes, ou le salut de la patrie, par un voyageur 
aérien, which was published on July 19.  In it, she rebuked the sup-
posedly inevitable authority of the Republic by arguing that all do-
mestic and foreign fighting should be brought to a halt for one 
month in order for the French people to decide whether they wanted 
a republic, federative or monarchic government (de Gouges, 1993, II: 
247).  There was a hearing on 1 November that year and she was 
executed two days later on 3 November.5 In March that very year the 
National Assembly had passed many of the laws that would legalize 
the most violent acts of terror in 1793-94.  It is one of these laws that 
is used to pass sentence on de Gouges.  “Whoever is convicted of 
having composed or printed works or writings which provoke the 
dissolution of the national representation, the reestablishment of 
royalty, or of any other power attacking the sovereignty of the peo-
ple, will be brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal and punished 
by death” (in Levy et. al. 1979, 259).  According to Pierre-Joseph 
Lamarque, who originally proposed this law on behalf of the Gen-
eral Safety Committee, the law was motivated by the growing 
amount of royal and anti-revolutionary printed matter, which he 
considered “the most dangerous weapon” in the hands of “suspect 
citizens” (Archieves Parlementaires 1867, [29] 699).
5 I have only been able to locate the charge against de Gouges in an English trans-
lation.  It is translated in Levy et.  al.  (1979, 254ff).
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The legal problem in connection with passing this law is that free-
dom of speech and freedom of the press were inscribed in the Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which the members of the Na-
tional Assembly under no circumstances wished to compromise 
even if they did not mind reinterpreting it along the lines of the in-
terests of the Republic.  In the discussions leading up to the execu-
tion of King Louis XVI in January 1793 some of the radical jacobins 
had realized, however, that certain criminals should not be sen-
tenced by way of the existing positive law of society but instead ac-
cording to the principles of natural law.  In natural law, self-defence 
– even when it results in death – is a given.  These criminals could be 
termed ennemi du genre humain or hors la loi, whereby they would be 
excluded from human society and its civil laws.6 Thus, the legal ma-
noeuvre consisted in judging certain criminals according to the law 
of nature, a manoeuvre made possible by categorizing criminals as 
either enemies of mankind or, literally, outlaws.  To be considered 
outside the law and regarded as an enemy of humanity equals an 
exclusion from the human community and the rules applying there. 
To exclude someone from the community of rights is exactly 
what Robespierre proposed to do to certain criminals in his sugges-
tion for an alternative Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
in 1793.  He writes that “those conducting war on a people in order 
to stop the progress of liberty and in order to exterminate the hu-
man rights must be persecuted everywhere.  Not as ordinary ene-
mies but as murderers and as rebellious brigands” (Robespierre 
1793, 7).  In this version of natural law, the idea of a state of nature 
plays a central ideological part.  Human rights have become some-
thing the Republic has to defend with violence against its enemies. 
It is because society is understood as a perpetual struggle between 
opposing interests that penalty of death comes to seem a just way of 
dealing with political adversaries.  Contrary to Olympe de Gouges 
and her inclusive idea of a universal human nature, humanity here 
is a closed and exclusive community that has to fight off “murder-
ers” and “rebellious brigands”.  During the Reign of Terror, such a 
version of natural law was on the one hand turned into positive law 
– it could be used to convict felonies – and on the other hand, the 
6 See Edelstein (2010/2009, especially 127ff) for a more thorough account of the 
natural rights theories that were developed during the trial against Louis XVI 
and that were brought to use repeatedly under the Terror.
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Republic was included as a subject of natural rights because it was, 
obviously, the Republic that gained the right to defend itself, a eu-
phemism for killing political adversaries.  
When Lamarque proposed the law that would later be used to 
pass judgement on de Gouges, he carried out this exact manoeuvre. 
On my own behalf, citizens, I declare loud and clear that I 
would consider myself guilty from the moment I should 
spare these terrible people that treat humanity as a herd of 
cattle only being held in order for them to consume it.
We must unite in a feeling of disgust for these tigers that do not 
deserve the name of men, in a feeling of loyalty among us and in 
sacrifice of all of our capacities in the fight to the death against them 
(Archieves Parlementaires 1867, [29] 698).
The rhetoric of the quotation stems from a register of natural 
rights in which political opponents are reduced to something inhu-
man or, stronger put, to wild animals trying to consume all of man-
kind as if they were a herd of cattle.  The death penalty is justified by 
categorizing felonies as enemies of humankind, enemies that every-
one has an obligation to fight to the death.  Here the concept of na-
ture has an excluding function contrary to the inclusive idea of hu-
man nature in the radical thought of de Gouges.  The state of nature 
is something dangerous that calls for extreme measures and some-
thing that necessitates a firm and deadly response to outside chal-
lenges.  It is also, clearly, an understanding of nature that includes 
some in the community of rights while others are excluded.
The Lamarque-quotation is a concrete example of a policy that 
operationalizes natural rights and the idea of the natural in a spe-
cific way.  With this lamarquian perspective as a point of departure, 
it is easy to criticize the natural rights tradition on which the Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man and Citizen is founded.  And in the light 
of historical developments it is just as easy to see the tragic element 
in the fact that exactly de Gouges wanted a law closer to nature and 
the principles of natural rights.  But there is another argument too: 
Nature, natural law and human rights can be used to question some 
of the norms, structures and positive laws that are otherwise in-
credibly hard to get a grasp of.  De Gouges’s challenge to a norma-
tive understanding of sexual differences and her defense of wom-
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en’s and illegitimate children’s rights are examples of how the 
rhetoric of human rights and the idea of the natural has been opera-
tionalized in a way that made it possible to see and criticize the fact 
that women were excluded from the political sphere as long as 
equality among brothers was the sole alternative to the paternal 
authority of the king.  
De Gouges actualizes the tension between an excluding and an 
including political operationalization of the concept of nature, and 
her work raises the question of who is included in the community 
of rights.  Hereby, she points towards a line drawn between those 
with and without the right to have rights, a line between those in 
accordance with and not in accordance with the concept of nature. 
In the eighteenth century, the idea of nature is characterized by its 
moral persuasiveness but also by its ambiguity, and the combina-
tion of these two features makes it a problematical but also privi-
leged rhetorical means in the development and continued negotia-
tion of a human community of rights.  The concept of nature might 
not have the same rhetorical impact in today’s political discourse, 
but the question of who have the right to have human rights is just 
as relevant today as it was in late eighteenth century France.
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